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The problem of having both a body and a name in the work of Jean-Luc Marion: Names, fathers 
and the hopeful possibilities of a queer phenomenology 
 
Abstract 
 
In this essay, and following upon both Jacques Lacan’s and Jacques Derrida’s personal struggles with fatherhood 
and the naming of their children, I take up what I consider to be Jean-Luc Marion’s failure to deal with the 
embodiment of fatherhood through an examination of patriarchal signification, or, specifically, the naming of one’s 
children after the father—at least insofar as Marion’s brief analysis of this symbolic act points toward his failure to 
think through the various potential and lived embodiments of the father.  I aim to illuminate how his efforts to 
continue this naming of the child with the father’s name speak more directly to an idealized (‘theologized’) vision of 
our world that need not be serviced, indeed, which we would benefit from not utilizing at all.  I wish, in an 
autobiographical-phenomenological response to Marion, to point to other names, other relationships and other ways 
of perceiving how one might be situated within our world—what I follow Sara Ahmed in calling ‘queer’ ways in 
which a phenomenological account of the subject’s identity is not a pretext for perpetuating a quasi-theological, 
patriarchal agenda. 
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Introduction 
 
It has been noted that Jacques Lacan’s articulation of his theory regarding the ‘Name of the 
Father’ perhaps stems directly from his inability to lend his name to a daughter born of a woman who was 
not his legally recognized wife.1  After all, ‘It is in the name of the father that we must recognize the 
support of the symbolic function which, from the dawn of history, has identified his person with the 
figure of the law’.2  This ‘absurd discrepancy’ between ‘the legal order’ and ‘everyday reality’ is no doubt 
a theoretical paradox worthy of some reflection, though whether or not such a paradox should have been 
his focus instead of the actual life of the living child was seemingly, in many ways, a less significant 
question.  Less significant to some perhaps, to focus on the actual person of the child, as well as the actual 
parenting of the father, is, in many ways, the purpose of my investigation in the present article and one 
that highlights, I feel, the often difficult relationship between the theoretical and the autobiographical.  
Hence I will introduce the major theme of this essay, and as it will be pursued through some of its 
contemporary manifestations, mainly in what follows in the work of the contemporary phenomenologist 
and theologian Jean-Luc Marion: The ‘Name of the Father’ contrasted with the care given (or at times 
                                                          
1
 Elisabeth Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan: Outline of a Life, History of a System of Thought (trans. Barbara Bray, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 163.   
2
 Jacques Lacan, ‘Function and Field of Speech and Language’, Écrits: A Selection (trans. Alan Sheridan, New 
York: W.W Norton, 1977), p. 67.  See also the recent translation On the Names-of-the-Father (trans. Bruce Fink, 
Cambridge: Polity, 2013). 
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avoided) by the father, and specifically as such a tension continues to affect the manner in which male 
philosophers, psychoanalysts and theologians continue to speculate on being a—or perhaps better, the—
‘father’.  The fact that God has most typically in the west been invoked as ‘Father’ certainly complicates 
our conceptualizations a good deal more, but this fact also underscores the importance of detailing just 
how divergent from lived reality our speculations on the ‘Father’ often become. 
 To continue for a moment with the example of Lacan, though essentially to illuminate the path I 
wish to take elsewhere, it is doubly interesting that Lacan rarely (or ‘never’ according to some) spoke of 
his parents or family origins.3  He would hardly even speak of his own ‘legitimate’ children, opting 
instead to shower his attention upon his youngest child, Judith, born ‘out of wedlock’ to him by Sylvia 
Bataille and prompting a divorce from his then wife Marie Louise.4  As for this youngest child, however, 
as Elisabeth Roudinesco has put it in her biography of Lacan,  
 
Judith returned her father’s devotion.  She could never see him except through the eyes of a filial 
piety that soon became hagiographical.  For her he was a living god of unshakable character and 
flawless magnanimity, forever being betrayed by unworthy disciples but always valiantly getting 
the better of those rash enough to oppose him.  And Lacan encouraged a worship that satisfied his 
deepest desires.5 
 
Though this may be nothing new to the many Lacanians who likewise revered their ‘master’ as a ‘god’ of 
sorts, Roudinesco, for one, recognizes the image of the jealous father as deity, a link utilized quite 
frequently within a western monotheistic landscape.  Lacan, too, it would seem, had his own ‘chosen 
ones’ and their declared favoritism would be more than a scandal to his family.  The uncomfortable 
distance which such favoritism for this ‘illegitimate’ child placed between Lacan and his other children 
was, for these children at least, unbearable.6  Lacan’s cold stance with regard to his ‘other’ children 
continued to invade their every encounter, including this brief, but chilling and indicative moment: 
 
                                                          
3
 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 242. 
4
 Sylvia Bataille was also the wife of the author Georges Bataille, whose relationship to his own father merits a 
closer inspection, one that I am unable to treat in this context.  See the account given in Michel Surya, Georges 
Bataille: An Intellectual Biography (trans. Krzysztof Fijalkowski and Michael Richardson, London: Verso, 2002). 
5
 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 185. 
6
 ‘But such favoritism had its effects on the children of his first marriage, especially on Thibaut and Sibylle.  They 
were unhappy at not being part of their father’s life, and the only thing they could take pride in was bearing his 
name.  Judith on the other hand, though she knew she was the favorite, suffered because she had not been made 
legitimate, and was afraid of being called a “bastard”.  All this gave rise to a growing rivalry between the two 
families’.  Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 185. 
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One Thursday Thibaut and Sibylle spent the afternoon […] in the Jardin d’acclimatation (zoo).  
On their way home they saw a car stop at a pedestrian crossing.  They immediately recognized 
their father, seated behind the wheel.  A woman was sitting beside him, and there was a little girl 
in the backseat.  Thibaut and Sibylle ran toward Lacan calling out “Dad! Dad!”  Lacan glanced at 
them in surprise, then looked away as if he hadn’t seen them, started up the car, and vanished into 
the traffic.  This was the Lacan children’s first “meeting” with Sylvia and Judith.  When they told 
Malou about their misadventure she answered sharply that Lacan had obviously neither seen nor 
heard them.  She was trying to excuse his behavior—the behavior of a father whom she wanted to 
go on living up to the image she had made of him.7 
 
It is sheer speculation of course as to what truly constituted Lacan’s notion of being a ‘good father’, and 
my introducing such a theme becomes—at a certain point—grist for a preemptive dismissal of the 
arguments that will follow.  There were undoubtedly various factors involved in such a ‘fatherly’ 
response to his increasingly estranged children—a patriarchal French culture, professorial expectations, 
his own desire to be a ‘master’ in the field of psychology—and many more factors undoubtedly 
completely unknown to us.  There is also, however, something of a certain ‘intellectual legacy’ of 
fatherhood and of the mastery associated with being the ‘father’  or ‘master’ of a scholarly field (e.g. 
psychoanalytic thought, deconstruction, phenomenology) that, I would argue, does permeate our 
understanding of their otherwise apparently ‘purely theoretical’ thoughts.  The failure to see such a 
connection, I contend, is what not only condones but also perpetuates the very heightened, albeit 
undisclosed, tensions present in the life one lives as a father, and also as a man, and the philosophical (and 
even theological) thoughts one suggests in their writing.  Though I am only at this point gesturing toward 
such a tension, I want to yet linger here a moment longer before moving closer to my intended point of 
analysis in the work of Marion.  At this point, and with Lacan as exemplar, I simply wish to illustrate the 
casual proximity between being the father, a master and a deity that has routinely clouded the French 
intellectual legacy with which we still work.   
 We might consider in this vein as well the proximity which both Lacan and another French 
thinker, Jacques Derrida.  In his recent biography of Derrida, Benoît Peeters chronicles Derrida’s 
longtime affair with Sylviane Agacinski, with whom Derrida also fathered an ‘illegitimate’ child.  As 
Peeters unfolds the dramatic details of Derrida’s son’s birth: ‘Apparently, Derrida saw Daniel at least 
once, shortly after his birth.  But he did all he could to keep the birth of his third son secret, especially 
from his mother, his brother, and his sister’.8  In this secretive state of affairs, Derrida rode the tension 
                                                          
7
 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 180-1. 
8
 Benoît Peeters, Derrida: A Biography (trans. Andrew Brown, Cambridge: Polity, 2013), p. 357. 
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between actually fathering a son and being a father to his son, something that entered his philosophical 
speculations at several points throughout his life, though often in obscure or indirect ways.  Though 
Derrida had developed a good share of his own philosophical critique through exposing the connections 
between a philosopher’s private life and their more theoretical writings, he was often loathe to present 
such connections on his own life in his work.9   
As Derrida described being a father to Elisabeth Roudinesco—the same person who chronicled 
Lacan’s life for us above—for example, and leaving out his own personal complications of actually being 
a father to his living children, he said 
 
Identifying a genitor is not the same as designating a father.  The genitor is not the father!  The 
father is someone who recognizes his child; the mother recognizes her child.  And not only in a 
legal sense.  The obscurity of the question lies entirely in this ‘experience’ that is so hastily called 
‘recognition’.  Beyond or on this side of law, its modalities can be diverse, complex, convoluted; 
they can spread, become stabilized or destabilized in the course of a history whose end is never 
determinable.  It is this ‘experience’ that will give rise to a very complex interweaving of 
symbolic possibilities – and that will found a bond (always more or less stable or fragile, never 
assured) between the ‘moment of the genitor’ and the ‘symbolic moment’.10 
 
Though Lacan would develop a notion of the ‘Name-of-the-father’ that would yet allow him to keep a 
certain personal distance from his lectures and writings, Derrida, though keeping a similar, formal 
distance, would also introduce a possible element of self-criticism into the semi-public eye, though not 
fully daring to enunciate such criticisms openly with regard to himself and his life choices and familial 
situations.  He saw that the father was not simply a biological role, but one involving the recognition of 
the child, something he himself apparently struggled to do in his personal life. 
In terms that would echo throughout his oeuvre with a powerful resonance, Derrida spoke of his 
child, and his desire for his child, as that which was ‘desirable’ but also ‘impossible’: 
 
Jacques said that he felt paralysed, unable to face a child even though he had dreamed of it as an 
event both desirable and impossible.  His bond with Marguerite was, in his view, indestructible, 
and paternity was a matter of too much significance for him to agree to it in a half-hearted way.  
                                                          
9
 As evidence of this claim, one need only view Amy Ziering and Kirby Dick’s documentary Derrida (2004), which 
demonstrates both his reticence to disclose details of his private, personal life alongside his desire to know the sex 
lives of the great philosophers.  It is within such a tension as this that we begin to detect something of his, what I 
will call, unraveling of the distance between his personal and philosophical lives. 
10
 Qtd. in Peeters, Derrida, p. 357. 
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He let Sylviane decide for herself, but assured her that he would accept whatever decision she 
came to.11 
 
We are dealt here with the full weight of responsibility and recognition, but also of making choices or of 
letting others make them for us.  The incredible interpretations that could be spun from such insights, not 
only within Derrida’s autobiographical writings in The Post Card—which stem at least in part from a 
series of letters or exchanges between himself and Sylviane,12 but also within his construal of the 
‘impossible possible’ or the possibility of the impossible, as well as the indestructible nature of 
deconstructionism itself, its foundations, or, I might add (as an apparently whimsical aside, but also 
therefore with absolute seriousness), its paternity—seem to abound from suggestions such as these.  From 
a theological viewpoint alone, it would be very interesting to discuss Derrida’s conceptualization of the 
divine as the ‘possible-impossible’ and his own feelings of the possibility-impossibility of fatherhood—
all contrasted with the historical legacy of seeing God as a ‘Father’ and with potentially seeing one’s 
father as God.13  Could an ‘atheist’—at least from this perspective—be someone who simply has no 
father?14 
 There is no doubt that we are dealing here with God, a certain conceptualization of ‘the father’, 
the divide between the legitimate and the illegitimate, and the name, given by the father to the child, as it 
was once given to the father and who tries to bear it as best he can, eventually passing it along to his 
progeny, though perhaps failing to do so as well and thus losing one’s faith, losing perhaps even one’s 
name.  For both Lacan and Derrida, these were painful personal topics.  We can imagine—even if we do 
not share—Derrida’s pain when, as Peeters tells us, he first learned of the decision of his son Pierre to 
publish his first book under the name of Pierre Alféri instead of Pierre Derrida, a decision which the 
father could not understand, and which he saw as ‘almost a form of denial’ of his heritage, of his actually 
being Pierre’s father.  Whether Derrida felt such tiny betrayals from his ‘illegitimate’ son’s actions is 
                                                          
11
 Peeters, Derrida, p. 356. 
12
 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond (trans. Alan Bass, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987). 
13
 As Peeters relates, it was in an interview with Maurizio Ferraris that Derrida remarked: ‘[T]here is always an 
inadequacy in the very idea of paternity: […] one can sign neither a child nor a work.  Being a father means having 
the extremely joyful and painful experience of the fact that one is not the father. […] Paternity is neither a state nor a 
property’.  Qtd. in Peeters, Derrida, p. 406-7.  On Derrida’s views in conjunction with any theological resonance 
they might have, see John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997). 
14
 I am playing here, of course, on Derrida’s own comments on his ‘rightly passing for an atheist’, as well as his 
commitment to being ‘the last of the Jews’, a ‘secret Jew’ and a self-proclaimed ‘marrano’.  See, for example, 
Jacques Derrida, ‘Abraham, the Other’, Judeities: Questions for Jacques Derrida (eds. Bergo, Bettina, Joseph 
Cohen and Raphael Zagury-Orly, trans. Bettina Bergo and Michael B. Smith, New York: Fordham University Press, 
2007). 
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unknown to us; whether he would have even cared about, or perhaps even ‘taken pride’ in, this ‘other’ 
son’s use of his own name is also unknown.  Peeters suspects such a backstory is what lingers in 
Derrida’s ruminations in his book Passions upon the giving of one’s name to something that one desires 
(‘narcissistically’) to possess, but also to lose oneself in: 
 
Suppose that X, something or someone (a trace, a work, an institution, a child) bears your name, 
in other words your title.  A naïve translation or a common fantasy: you have given your name to 
X, so everything that belongs to X, directly or by a circuitous route, in a straight or an oblique 
line, belongs to you, like a surplus for your narcissism. […] Conversely, suppose that X does not 
want your name or your title; suppose that, for one reason or another, X frees himself from it and 
chooses another name, effecting a sort of repeated weaning from the originary weaning; then your 
narcissism, doubly wounded, will ipso facto find itself all the more enriched: what bears, has 
borne, will bear your name appears sufficiently, powerful, creative, and autonomous to live alone 
and dispense radically with you and your name.  He returns to your name, to the secret of your 
name, so as to be able to disappear in your name.15 
 
Is this passage a sort of coming-to-terms with his son’s act?  It seems to suggest as much, though 
obliquely.  It certainly, however, might help to explain his ‘secret’ relationship to Judaism, a tradition that 
claimed him, that named him, and which he dispensed with without really dispensing with it either.16 
At any rate, the name which the father Derrida tried to give to his son, and which lingers still 
within his own philosophical legacy, is a difficult one to trace, as it was also undoubtedly construed along 
a path that has been traversed over many centuries and by many men.  What exactly Derrida sought for 
his son, beyond his own name, was also less than clear at times, an indicator, in many ways, of a certain 
obscurity wherein the father’s priorities are often made to lie—within vague gestures, or names given 
without the giving of one’s self.  It is precisely against such an obscuring of relations that we must 
continue to press against this subtle, but pervasive notion of fatherhood, probing deeper into the 
connections between the father, fatherhood, God and the many subtle (‘secret’) relations bound up within 
these names. 
 
 
The legacy of fatherhood in the phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion 
 
                                                          
15
 Qtd. in Peeters, Derrida, p. 407. 
16
 See, among others, the commentary on Derrida and religious belief offered by Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of 
Jacques Derrida. 
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John Caputo has offered a critique of the contemporary French phenomenologist Jean-Luc 
Marion that runs essentially along these lines: the bodies that Marion attempts to depict in his work are 
glorious, ethereal bodies, not the actual, lived bodies we inhabit on an everyday basis.17  They are ‘light’, 
ephemeral and not really an account at all of the embodied beings that we truly are.  The autobiographical 
has been torn away from the phenomenological and it is time that we learn to take it more seriously.  To 
my mind such a critique as Caputo registers shares in Giorgio Agamben’s parallel efforts to demonstrate 
how our historical-theological talk about glorious, resurrected bodies is likewise little more than an 
ineffectual attempt to talk about our lived bodies, one that is projected onto an idealized plane and which 
seeks to maintain its own invested interests rather than to take up the lived bodily realities in which we 
dwell.18  My concern is with what such speculations that deviate from our lived reality are really up to, 
what theological positions they (consciously or unconsciously) seek to legitimate and how a critique of 
such viewpoints might possibly lead us in a more productive direction. 
In what follows, and riding fast on the heels of both Lacan’s and Derrida’s struggles with 
fatherhood and the naming and raising of their children, I wish to take up Marion’s failure to deal with the 
embodiment of fatherhood through an examination of what may appear at first to be its opposite:  the 
patriarchal act of signification, or, specifically, the naming of one’s children after the father—at least 
insofar as Marion’s brief analysis of this symbolic act might point toward what I will contemplate as his 
failure to think through the various potential and lived embodiments of the father.  What I am aiming at in 
the end is to illuminate how his efforts to continue this naming of the child with the father’s name speak 
more directly to an idealized (even ‘theologized’) vision of our world that need not be serviced—indeed, 
which we would benefit from not utilizing at all.  I wish then to point to other names, other relationships 
and other ways of perceiving how one might be situated within our world—what I will call ‘queer’ ways 
in which a phenomenological account of the subject’s identity is not a pretext for perpetuating a quasi-
theological, patriarchal agenda. 
The question Marion raises in his ‘magnum opus’ Being Given is certainly straight-forward 
enough: ‘Why does he [the father] give him [the apparently masculine child] a name?’19  The father, we 
are told, should know of his paternity ‘from his own deeds, from his own wife, [from what he sees] in his 
house, in front of him, etc.’, but he has his doubts—at this point no more than abstract doubts to match an 
abstract father—as to whether or not this child is actually his.20  Barring any actual context of a father in 
                                                          
17
 These remarks were delivered as a lecture entitled ‘God Without Being, Life without Death, Bodies without Flesh: 
The Fate of all Flesh in Jean-Luc Marion’ at the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, on 18 March 2008. 
18
 Giorgio Agamben, ‘The Glorious Body’, Nudities (trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2010). 
19
 Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness (trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 300. 
20
 Marion, Being Given, p. 300. 
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doubt, and reducing the particularities of any given father’s lived experience of such situations, Marion 
aims for a general sensibility concerning the experience of being a father.  ‘These excellent reasons 
nevertheless suffer from a well-known weakness’, as he puts it, though this is not apparently the fact that 
not all fathers have a ‘wife’, that not all children take the father’s name or that not every birth has a 
discernible father figure (as in the case of lesbian households, for example).  The weakness, for Marion, is 
rather that ‘by definition, in fact on account of the temporal delay of birth’s initial belatedness to 
conception, biological paternity remains without immediate and direct proof, always doubtful (and 
technologically it will become more and more so in the near future)’.21 
 Though I am not sure what future Marion envisages when he speculates that paternity tests might 
suddenly become more difficult to utilize, rather than, as current evidence points to, more common, 
efficient and reliable (or perhaps he is referring to artificial insemination, to which one can only speculate 
whether he would see this as a severe blow to the necessary act of paternal signification), his point seems 
to hinge on the father’s ability to doubt his biological paternity, an inherent state of paternal anxiety, one 
might suggest.  The core of his concern focuses on whether or not the father is convinced of his being the 
father—that is, convinced, I would suggest practically-speaking, of his own need to be responsible for the 
child in some sense—a situation that, by its very nature, implicates the very existence of language (and, 
hence, naming) itself.  Marion does not draw a distinction between genitor and recognition of the child, as 
Derrida had done, but focuses solely on the name given to the child as that which bestows fatherhood. 
The implication seems to be that the father becomes involved with the child not through raising 
the child as his child, but through an act of naming—as if such an act were enough in itself to convey the 
father’s responsibility to the child, though it is a responsibility without having to actually engage the 
child, that is, not really an embodied responsibility at all.  Though it is certainly the case that many 
‘fathers’ are not actually the biological fathers of their children (e.g. through re-marriage, adoption, etc.), 
it is the process of performing the role of the father to a child, of taking up the responsibilities of the 
father as such, wherein one becomes the father, if it may be put that way.  This is, however, not a 
condition of fatherhood that Marion seems eager to take up, and this is presumably why the language of 
responsibility and of recognition is not one that he chooses in this context.  What intrigues me at this 
point is what he does choose to take up, and exactly how he chooses to discuss it, especially as his 
approach contains an overtly theological perspective. 
                                                          
21
 Marion, Being Given, p. 300.  In his essay ‘The Reason of the Gift’, trans. Shane Mackinlay and Nicolas de 
Warren, Givenness and God: Questions of Jean-Luc Marion, eds. Ian Leask and Eoin Cassidy (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2005), Marion goes on to speculate that the absent father is not only absent through the insecurity 
of not knowing if the child is truly theirs, but also because fathers ‘remain united with the child only by taking 
leave—precisely so as then to pass on his help: as extroverted provider, hunter, warrior, or traveler; in short, as one 
who constantly returns, coming back to the hearth from which he must distance himself if he wants to maintain it.  
In order to live there, the father must be missing, and thus shine by his absence’ (p. 119). 
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 In many ways, his remarks should be read, I think, as an effort to determine the fundamental 
location of the father.  What results from this seems to be nothing short of a certain paternal anxiety about 
whether or not the father can claim the child before him as his own—one that, I would suppose, will 
never go away because it does not enter into the domain of taking-responsibility for the child as a father 
(or simply parent) to the child.  Another way to frame this, though one that may be beyond Marion’s 
vision of such a relationship, is whether or not the father is entitled to claim this child—and perhaps this, I 
would suggest, is the real anxiety the father faces according to Marion: whether or not they have 
contributed enough to the birth of this child and therefore whether they are to have any stake in the child’s 
coming into this world.  But this is an anxiety unstated by Marion—indeed, it is one that remains 
completely foreign to Marion in this context, and for possible reasons that I will explore in a moment.  In 
many ways, I would suggest that it is a possibility that must remain foreign to the vision of fatherhood 
that Marion describes, if such a notion of fatherhood is to be maintained throughout subsequent 
generations. 
 As we see in Marion’s analysis, it is as if symbolic language itself were given to us in order to 
allow fathers to accept a responsibility they might otherwise flee from, or perhaps, following my reading, 
in order for fathers to lay claim over that which they are fundamentally anxious about—whether or not 
they have any stake in the identity of the child.  Moreover, the child’s sense of being ‘received’ (a point 
not insignificant in a book that tries to establish the ontological priority of givenness) is dependent upon 
the father’s always anonymous donation: ‘the father appears as the giver who is perfectly reduced to 
givenness’.22  Indeed, it is an act of juridical recognition (the act of naming through language) that gives 
the child a sense of ‘being received’ by the father—which is apparently the more significant act either of 
the two (male-female) parents can bestow upon the child: ‘The father becomes one, in all cases and not 
only in adoption, only by his decision to recognize, ask for, and claim as his own the foundling and 
natural child’.23  Here, however, the sense of recognition seems to differ from Derrida’s sense, as there is 
no responsibility implied within such a recognition—unless the courts perhaps would deem it so. 
 So, why does the father claim the child?  Why give the child his name?  As Marion seeks to 
establish, ‘The child silently calls the father to call him with his name—with the name of the father, with 
the name that he does not have, which is not and never will be his own’.24  Hence, we are faced with the 
                                                          
22
 Marion, ‘The Reason of the Gift’, p. 120.  As he continues, ‘Fatherhood thus lays out, in fact and by right, the 
whole phenomenality of a gift reduced to pure givenness’ (p. 121).  It should be noted here, as Christina 
Gschwandtner has pointed out, ‘Exceeding metaphysics through and because of the givenness of charity—this 
characterizes all of Marion’s thought from his early writings on Descartes to his most recent statements about the 
erotic phenomena.  And in the final count this is what Marion’s work is all about: the generous givenness that pours 
itself out in abandon for the other […]’.  Christina M. Gschwandtner, Reading Jean-Luc Marion: Exceeding 
Metaphysics (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007), p. 250. 
23
 Marion, Being Given, p. 300. 
24
 Marion, Being Given, p. 301. 
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unknown or ultimately unknowable father—it matters little which one—who yet names the child with his 
alienating claim made upon the child.  Rather than steer such a discussion toward the many fathers who in 
reality are unknown to their children, not through their inability to name them (and as many such children 
do in fact bear the absent father’s name), but through their literal absence, Marion tries to establish a 
phenomenological sketch of why such absences are inherent to the role of the father in the child’s life—
something which, practically speaking, can only appear as a most dangerous legitimation of a father’s 
absence, perhaps indirectly justifying the choices and anxieties of many truly absent fathers.  As he puts it 
in an earlier essay on the subject, ‘To start with, the father is missing because he procreates in only a 
moment and, having become useless, withdraws immediately—in contrast to the mother, who remains, 
and in whom the child remains.  The mother’s immanence to the child stigmatizes the father’s unfortunate 
transcendence’.25  Besides introducing a troubling displacement of the burden of transcendence upon the 
mother’s own immanence—a disturbing suggestion in many regards as it appears to blame the mother’s 
closeness to the child for the father’s absence, and that also has significant theological implications for 
understanding a ‘distant’ fatherly God—Marion likewise assumes the mother’s desire to remain (and 
which is certainly not true of all mothers) as well as the father’s apparent inability to ‘remain’ with the 
child (and which is not necessarily true of many father’s experiences).  With no link being made between 
‘remaining’, responsibility and recognition, we are left to infer that the mother, who remains and 
recognizes her child is inherently also responsible for the child (‘immanent’), while the father is forced 
(by nature as it were) to be absent, recognizing the child in name only and therefore not responsible in the 
same way as a mother (‘transcendent’).  This treatment of the father’s relationship to the child is rife with 
theological implications, not least of which is the conceptualization of an absent (transcendent) God from 
our world. 
Despite the fact that he does not clarify in this context what is meant exactly by ‘remaining’ with 
the child (i.e. is this the one who feeds the child, who changes the diapers, who rocks them gently to 
sleep, who wakes at night to hold them, etc.?), he does proceed in Being Given to elaborate upon the 
consequence of such an inherently ‘missing’ father: 
 
The anonymity of the call (and of the child) neither contradicts nor interdicts paternity, but 
constitutes its terrain, stakes, and condition of possibility.  The father will therefore be born into 
his own paternity to the extent that he responds to the child’s anonymous call with a naming 
response.  This nomination is laid out in a history: first, the father gives his own name (last 
                                                          
25
 Marion, ‘The Reason of the Gift’, p. 119. 
11 
 
name), then the first name (Christian name), both borrowed; next he gives real identity, through 
word, speech, and language, then through the community, religion, “Weltanschauung,” etc..26 
 
Central to the act of introducing the child to the social world around them, according to Marion, fathers 
provide a symbolic birth to the child, and therefore claim their right to name the child with their name, to 
offer the child a piece of the fundamentally alienating experience of entering language, that is, of entering 
our world.  Rather than understand such acts as essential to the practices and maintenance of masculine 
domination—as Pierre Bourdieu has done, for example27—Marion seeks to further elucidate their 
universal applicability to all acts of naming, and to subsume such acts as phenomenologically ‘natural’ to 
a father’s experience: 
 
[…] for as the father has no biological certainty of his paternity, the child has no immediate and 
direct proof of his filiation; he must accept it, on the faith of the father, following the symbolic 
argument of his being recognized by him.  This is in fact translated by adopting the father’s name 
as collateral for his own adoption by the father.  Therefore, the child bears—as a heavy burden 
and a tiresome yoke—a name that is not his.  That name […] comes upon him as a fait accompli 
always already done for and without him, indeed counter to him.28 
 
Concerning this proper name given by the father—and which is received in ‘faith’, he tells us—it 
is, we are told, always ‘improper’ and ‘alienating’.  These are merely the inherent characteristics of what 
the father brings through the anonymous names it has been given and which traverse his own body as a 
field of symbolically constituted tensions, and which he now brings to bear upon his child.  Rather than 
describe such a state as the very fabric by which patriarchy constitutes itself, and the site of historical-
theological speculations on the role of God the Father in our world, and therefore critique it as something 
not intrinsically ‘natural’ to the state of being a father, but rather as an unnecessary inscription made upon 
the body of the child, Marion, however, unfolds what I would argue constitutes the very powerful hold of 
the patriarchical father: 
 
It matters little that I love or hate him, that I admire or condemn him, since in every case I can 
identify with myself only by referring myself to him.  Before me, more within me than myself, 
this name calls me and thus calls me to him.  My historicity is declared to the degree that I add 
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varying responses to the name’s singular unique call, ranging from acceptance to refusal, 
adherence to forgetting.  But this name that calls thus still remains strangely anonymous.29 
  
Though Marion perhaps did not intend it, this sketch is, in my opinion, a fine and detailed explanation of 
patriarchical psychic inscription, of how one, almost unconsciously, enters into the power of patriarchy, 
and of how one is in fact named by it completely beyond one’s will.  It is as anonymous as it is directly 
linked to the Name-of-the-Father, which the children bear.  It can be rejected or fought against, but its 
efforts are intended precisely to inscribe itself more definitively upon the subject the more one struggles 
against it.  It is also a poignant and chilling description of what has gone wrong with certain western 
conceptions of God and their ability to turn people off to their ‘powerful’ hold upon humanity. 
What Marion does not consider within this schema of fatherhood are those who reject such 
processes altogether, and who refuse to continue the legacy of the father’s name in such a manner—
selected feminists and atheists alike.  Such sentiments, as I see it, actually remain foreign to his 
explication of naming the child, for the ability to live otherwise than this—in ways I will in a moment 
refer to as ‘queer’—is almost wholly unknown to such fathers. 
Theologically speaking, it is at this precise juncture within Marion’s exposition that patriarchical 
power finds what may be its ultimate justification, one that obviously finds no room for the example of 
the mother.  The call for a form of pure giving-in-excess—and without expectation of return—is what 
characterizes for him both the giving of the father and the giving of God, as father, and as a transcendent 
force that is also, we may presume, occasionally ‘stigmatized’ by the immanence of the mother who 
remains with us.  The true recognition of transcendence, then, is at the cost of the immanent-mother—its 
symbolic opposite—who stigmatizes the ‘unfortunate’ transcendence that must go out, be absent and yet 
return to give life to all that remains.  In his words, 
 
The father appears without contest as he for whom I, as the child, can do nothing, as he to whom I 
can render nothing, as he whom I will allow to die alone.  However, the neglect in which I must 
finally abandon him, regardless of what may happen and what my filial sentiments may be, has 
nothing to do with a bitter impotence or a harsh injustice.  For, before all else, it marks the sole 
indisputable transcendence that all human life can and must recognize in its own immanence; 
with the result that if we ever have to name God with a name, it is very appropriate to call Him 
“Father”—and Him alone: “Call no one on earth your father, for you have only one Father, and 
He is in heaven” (Matthew 23:0)’.30 
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Again offering as patriarchal stalwart to name what lies before him—though in this case, attempting to 
name God as a father names his child—Marion signals the necessary recognition of transcendence within 
the immanence that remains with us.31  Yet this connection becomes highly problematic when he 
explicitly links fatherhood with the Christian God, and, while doing so, perpetuates the claims made by 
the absent father who is God, and who is liable to remain as absent as he is able to be. 
 Marion’s presentation of fatherhood in relation to divine transcendence hence appears in many 
ways as a justification for the absentee and irresponsible father, an upholding of patriarchal normativity 
and its generational legitimacy, an unfair ‘stigmatizing’ of the mother’s lived responsibility for her child 
and the presentation of traditional theological claims in the guise of a rigorous phenomenology that does 
not actually progress our theological reflection very far.  The fact that his analysis of fatherhood and the 
naming of the child with the father’s name are a paradigmatic example of his definition of ‘givenness’ 
makes this critique that much more problematic, in my eyes, as well as significant to note. 
 What Marion simply does not account for, among other things, are those persons who do not want 
to take part in this process of naming and absenteeism, who wish to live outside this scope of masculine 
domination and who seek another way toward understanding the giving of one’s identity.  He does not 
therefore take account of those who envision alternative theological viewpoints, or who see God beyond 
such limited characterizations.  Rather than assume a given phenomena and consequently seek to 
legitimate it through a particular phenomenological exposition—and which has immediate religious 
undertones as the ‘revealed’ phenomena that is simply given to us, as Christiana Gschwandtner describes 
Marion’s methodology32—perhaps we could proceed from the experience of the phenomena itself and let 
such experiences dictate altogether new terms.  Would not such methods actually be a better form of 
phenomenological inquiry?  Specifically, rather than have one’s identity be given by an anonymous call 
that ‘results directly from the alienation that it imposes’, and that gives its name at the same moment as it 
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withdraws it and ‘says nothing besides a name’, we might benefit from another approach to understanding 
our relational identities, one that opens us up to the multiple configurations of fatherhood beyond its 
inscription in patriarchal norms. 
 My contention is that Marion, through averting our gaze to an abstraction and legitimation of 
certain given societal norms—for what else is the eternally anonymous father who becomes a god and 
who justifies patrilineal descent?—actually avoids having to contend with the phenomena that should 
most concern the relationship of parent to child, the one he neglects when he takes up the father as 
opposed to the mother, but also as established in the father himself: the body, or even the bodies, before 
him.  As Gayle Salamon has put it, ‘Perhaps the most vital aspect of phenomenology is its insistence that 
the body is crucial for understanding subjectivity’.33  Yet this is exactly what, I will contend—and as 
Caputo had already indicated to us—Marion neglects when he decides to speak to the manner in which 
we are called by the processes of naming. 
 
 
Toward an embodied (‘queer’) phenomenology 
 
We would do well to recall at this point the words of Judith Butler in her early work on creating 
Gender Trouble: ‘The masculine linguistic position undergoes individuation and heterosexualization 
required by the founding prohibitions of the Symbolic law, the law of the Father.  The incest taboo that 
bars the son from the mother and thereby instates the kinship relation between them is a law enacted “in 
the name of the Father”’.34  The feminine in some sense, by this reading, has served for many years to 
disrupt this hegemonic account of symbolic structures, mainly as it is left out of them altogether—
‘disrupt’ in Butler’s words, ‘stigmatize’ in Marion’s.  The shift in perspective is subtle, but crucial.  And, 
of course, Marion has no account to give—or simply allow—of the maternal claim made upon the child, 
no description of just how the mother ‘remains’ with the child while the father apparently does not.35  
Perhaps this is so because it is simply assumed, or perhaps because he assumes it poses no anxiety or 
doubt for the mother (and which is undoubtedly not true of a good many mother’s experiences).36   
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What circulates on the periphery would seem to be the feminine, or if not simply the feminine, 
then at least what is ‘queer’ to the patriarchal inheritance.  As Sara Ahmed describes it in the context of 
formulating a ‘queer phenomenology’, ‘The threat of queer is a “death threat”: queer desires threaten to 
discontinue the father’s line’.37  What is ‘queer’ is a deviation from the ‘naturalized’ lines of descent, and 
despite such lines being a cultural construction for the privilege of a few.38  What is ‘queer’ therefore is 
what will be opposed to Marion’s lines of patriarchal inscription.39 
What I want to take a look at briefly in this section—though I will not be able to develop these 
intuitions here in any great depth—is the necessarily difficult work of realigning one’s orientation in 
social terms, the movement one can make in many ways, from gender to gender, from sexual to paternal, 
among others—a line of deviation from Marion’s normativity and from what arises within even my own 
experience of the body, my body, not an abstraction to a ‘father’s body’ even, but my body so particular 
that its experience must be listened to as much as one’s conscience.  What such gestures point toward, 
contrary to the ethereal bodies and abstracted (and alienated) selves Marion deals with, is a ‘reinhabiting’ 
of one’s bodily being, ‘given that one’s body no longer extends the space or even the skin of the social’.  
As Ahmed continues, ‘These differences in how one directs desire, as well as how one is faced by others, 
can “move” us and hence affect even the most deeply ingrained patterns of relating to others’.40 
 What I am trying to sketch an introduction toward—and I do so happily acknowledging a host of 
feminist and queer theorists who have gone before me, but which have not yet apparently had an impact 
upon phenomenologically-minded theologians such as Marion—is a more productive look at embodiment 
that would involve a mixture of methodologies and a jettisoning of assumptions.  What I want to develop 
is little more than what has already been developed within my own horizon of experience, and which, if 
critically reflected upon without any prior assumptions, becomes a methodology that is critically attentive 
to our tendencies to ‘idealize’ phenomenological accounts of our experiences.  What I am arguing for is 
that there must be a self-critical methodology that allows us to examine our phenomenological 
descriptions, one that takes account of our individual, embodied lives and that does not seek to abstract 
(‘phenomenologically’ or otherwise) from them.41  What I wish to gesture toward is also a call for the 
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necessity of a carefully attentive autobiographical element within our given phenomenological 
descriptions. 
 Hence, I want to make a preliminary confession, but one that has—through its very existence—a 
right, I feel, to critically address Marion’s claims: I have a (‘biological’, ‘legitimate’) son who does not 
have my last name, whose name was not given to him by an abstract, abstracted or (hopefully not) 
abstracting ‘father’.  What I give to him through my attempts to ‘remain’ with him and not to transcend 
my relations with him is in fact what I ultimately give to him: a givenness that need not rely upon certain 
absences in order to establish its relations ‘to the child’.  What I have discovered through this experience 
of parenting—my experience of parenting to my son—are a number of things that might be surprising to 
Marion, for my phenomenological experience has been quite different than the one he depicts concerning 
the paternity doubts suffered by, apparently, many a man—though, I confess, not by me, not once.   
 Firstly, I do not think it worthwhile to begin a discussion of parenting from the standpoint of a 
father’s questionable paternity, and not simply because such claims prove less than helpful in the contexts 
of adoption or same-sex marriages.  And I will not begin either from the place of the mother who does not 
feel attached to her child despite giving birth to her child, nor from the experiences of those children 
separated from their mothers at birth, reunited after many years and yet utterly lacking in any sense of 
maternal bond with them.  I could begin with examples such as these, and I believe that each poses a 
serious challenge to Marion’s supposed phenomenological account of fatherhood, yet I will begin 
elsewhere, with a place I consider to be more of a challenge phenomenologically speaking. 
 Rather, I begin from my experience as a parent, one that I feel Marion also gets wrong: I felt not 
like a father when I was naming—an experience I have not had, and frankly do not wish to have; rather, I 
felt like a parent when I was parenting, and thus responsible for my child, not their name—engaged in a 
form of recognition of my child that is connected to ‘remaining’ with my child and entering ‘fatherhood’ 
from such a place.  These are the moments, for example, when I am solidly grounded in my child’s 
dependence upon me as the primary caregiver, and which had often resulted in people’s remarks, 
especially during the first years of his life, that I was ‘mothering’ him—that is, when I ‘remained’ with 
him when my wife was away at work or when I was the only one to watch over him for long periods of 
time.  From my perspective—and despite its almost reductionistic simplicity—it was and is a simple 
exercise of recognizing myself as a father: to engage parenting the child as the primary caregiver means 
that you simply may not have to deal with any inherent feelings of alienation said to be inevitably 
connected to the father’s name.  I knew I was my son’s father because I acted like his father, I performed 
being his father every day, at the park, in the bathroom, in the kitchen and on the sidewalk.  What was 
given to my son was me, not my name; what I gave him was my body, not an abstracted self—not even the 
tempting abstraction of the life of a professor.   
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 I recall, for example, the shock of certain parents when noting how our son moved fluidly 
between parents whenever his need arose, such as when he fell down while playing and sought comfort, 
his first choice of parent often reflecting whom he had spent more time with that particular day, and 
sometimes oscillating each day in turn.  Such experiences are still relatively new to our era, as it is 
traditionally the mother who engages the child at this level of everyday needs, and I suspect some 
traditional retooling is much needed in Marion’s language in this regard.  I recall too my experiences of 
another form of ‘alienation’, that which I felt in relation to other men when I chose to be the primary 
parent, when I had to be in the kitchen cooking while the other men were free to move about the home, 
neglecting, I would say, their parental duties, which were mainly left to their wives.  What I noticed in 
fact was that the closer I moved toward caring for my child, the further I would be from those other men 
whose primary orientation toward the world was one of, following Marion on this (as I believe he very 
accurately depicts this), a fundamental alienation from other men, from their fathers, from their children 
and even from their wives.  The more I unreservedly offered myself and my body to my child, the less 
alienation would have to chance to enter into our relationship. 
I recall too the shared sensibility between my feelings toward my child and other (mainly) 
mothers, who often commented that they had never heard a man say such things before about their child, 
and in a number of different contexts (e.g. such as when I confessed that I sometimes did not want my son 
to play with other kids on the playground because that meant he had to detach from me and his need for 
me at that moment, among others—and this feeling would of course linger despite my being perfectly fine 
with, indeed encouraging, his desire to go play with other children).  Reflections such as these were ones 
that were, at times, easily shared with other women who had a basis to understand my feelings, but were 
nearly impossible for me to share with other men, who were often unable to absorb my sentiments. 
 What I find powerfully moving in this series of my own reflections is, as Ahmed puts it, ‘Queer 
orientations are those that put within reach bodies that have been made unreachable by the lines of 
conventional genealogy’.42  Paradoxically, as well, for me, this meant having to reframe my social bodily 
orientation in order to actually reach my own child—to break down the notion of fatherhood that had been 
given (in Marion’s sense of the word) to me in order to parent my child without an accompanying sense 
of alienation.  I had to work past a patriarchal notion of alienation in order to claim my child as my own—
not through my bestowing a name or legacy upon him, or trying to possess him in any sense—but through 
my bodily activity in relation to him, playing games with him, caring for him, holding him, loving him.  
This re-alignment of bodily orientation, to be more specific, was nothing extra-ordinary; in fact, it was 
extremely ‘ordinary’ in many ways, and made up the stuff of going to supermarkets, playgrounds, running 
errands, etc.  It was in the way in which these moments were structured as a relationship between the two 
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of us—the casual closeness of our bodies, our engaged looks at each other, the willingness to ‘waste’ time 
doing what matters to the child, etc.—that differed from the ways in which other fathers related to their 
children.  This was a difference I felt then, and still feel now. 
In this I find Ahmed’s words to be very true, and true of a place that reaches far beyond the space 
that Marion describes.  Such a queering of relations: ‘[…] is not about the romance of being off line or the 
joy of radical politics (though it can be), but rather the everyday work of dealing with the perceptions of 
others, with the “straightening devices” and the violence that might follow when such perceptions congeal 
into social forms’.43  Contrary to Marion’s offering of fatherhood as exemplary of the phenomenological 
notion of givenness, I would rather offer the example of parenting itself as the givenness we should be 
searching for, and as perhaps the most non-romantic romance one could undergo—the everydayness of 
wiping a nose, cleaning up a mess, feeding a screaming child or of putting one’s work to one side in order 
to play with toy cars once again.  Such forms of giving oneself to one’s child are absent in Marion’s 
account, and, I suspect, for good reason: they are the basis of ‘remaining’ with the child, a task that many 
fathers simply do not embody and which Marion himself does not consider. 
 Rather than offer my experience as merely an exception to a norm, I offer it as a call for a 
political ‘disorientation’ from the fundamental alienation that Marion speaks of and which affects many 
fathers.44  We can and do live in other ways than the one he depicts, and I see no reason to accept his 
account of fatherhood as either appealing or as phenomenological.  But I should also clarify this 
statement: When I read Marion’s description of fatherhood and givenness, my problem with his account, 
then, is not that I do not recognize it in my own experience, or as my own experience; rather, I do 
recognize it, all-too-well—I simply reject it.  His account of fatherhood is and remains that obstacle to 
genuine parenting that I have sought very hard in my life to overcome and which continues to alienate 
fathers from their children, fathers from other fathers (and mothers!), and fathers from themselves, as they 
seek to ‘make a name’ for themselves out in the world, but fail to make those relationships that are crucial 
to being a more fully responsible human being.  In short, this is the problematic which I sense underlying 
a good many (very often patriarchal) philosophical and theological accounts of identity formation, and 
which do not have to continue to exist as such.  Again, borrowing from Marion, but distancing myself 
from Marion’s linkages of terms, there is a certain excess within this givenness, but not necessarily one 
that Marion himself might recognize—it is an excess that we might rather do without.     
 
 
Conclusion   
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What remains of the theological in all of this?  How are we to take such reflections and 
challenges as ones that affect the ways in which we perform theological reflections?  How are we to look 
at God as Father and not feel abandoned or alienated by his inherent ‘transcendence’ of our world and our 
lives?  My answer at this point to all of these questions is that we have not yet truly begun to see what 
theology might look like once such considerations are taken more fully into account.  We are still, indeed, 
a long way from discovering what theology is truly capable of providing humanity. 
It is perhaps somewhat commonplace to hear of certain contextual theologians talk about the 
ways in which various historical understandings of God have been confused with a white, male, western 
perspective.45  It is also somewhat common to hear of a woman’s conflation of her search for a husband 
with her desire for God.46  What is sadly still rather uncommon is to hear a man admit his own desire to 
confuse himself with God, to illuminate the error of his thinking that he in some way is God.  In all my 
years of taking theology classes—three masters degrees, a doctorate and all three Catholic canonical 
degrees—I never encountered a male professor who began to talk about sovereignty, transcendence, 
universality, abstraction, absence, alienation or a host of related terms with a confession that these terms 
were difficult to talk about or to define because he had trouble in discerning where these terms applied to 
God and where they applied to himself, as a man, as one taught to reflect the fundamental alienation that 
men are in very practical terms named by.  Theology is utterly clouded with such overlaps and 
confusions, ones that are rarely understood for what they are and far less distinguished and renounced.  
Realistically, perhaps I have not heard such talk because most men do not have an alternative paradigm at 
hand to express such a divergence from these patriarchal norms.  And theology, in many forms and in 
ways we have yet to fully uncover, continues to suffer as a result. 
It is my contention in this essay that a more robust account of our alternative experiences as men, 
and in this case specifically as fathers, one that is phenomenologically more genuine to the alternative 
experiences of living relationships that are in fact possible, can yield new and productive ways through 
which to envision and engage those networks of relations (beyond gendered norms, beyond sexual norms) 
that we are already immersed in, but constantly seeking to transcend in many ways.  It can also offer us 
completely new ways to perceive ourselves as theologians as well, and maybe then to find a variety of 
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‘contextual theologies’ as not that removed from us (mainly white) men after all.47  I offer here therefore 
my all-too-brief suggestions toward an alternative ‘queering’ of phenomenology in the hopes that they 
might spur other men, other fathers, toward providing other expressions of their relationships, and the 
hopes that genuinely accompany them. 
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